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INTRODUCTION 
The European public transport scene was revolutionised by the British deregulation of 1986 
but the more cautious bus reform by route tendering introduced in London in 1984 appeared 
to be a more convincing example for many countries. Copenhagen, e.g., introduced a similar 
regime and route-by-route competitive tendering has now become the norm in almost the 
whole of both Denmark and Sweden and can reckon on a growing number of adepts in other 
countries. Network tendering, as practiced in French urban areas and in the British railway 
sector, is the main alternative. This regime has the advantage of enabling operators to enjoy 
some of the service design freedoms enjoyed by deregulated operators. In practice, however, 
operators have much less leeway to use their inventiveness to change services in France than 
in Britain. Both route and network tendering are in (slow) evolution though. Various quality 
control instruments are being added and the more daring authorities transfer some planning 
powers to operators as traditional tendering proved to be more successful in cost-cutting than 
in increasing passenger numbers. 
A major impetus for a further spread of reform in EU-countries is the commitment of the 
European Commission to revise regulation 1191/69 pertaining to the payment of compensa-
tions for Public Service Obligations to transport operators. As yet, many countries struggle 
with the legal and practical implications of the pending changes.  
This paper will provide an overview of some important recent evolutions in a number of 
countries of the European Union, present the EU-proposal, possible amendments and discuss 
some main resulting challenges. 
THE PAST 10 YEARS 
Introduction 
More than a decade ago, a paper by Gwilliam and van de Velde (1990) analysed the potential 
for regulatory change in European bus markets. That paper was written in the context of the 
analysis of the consequences of the British bus deregulation that took place a few years ear-
lier. It reviewed attitudes to deregulation in ten Western European countries (Eire, West Ger-
many, Italy, France, Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Sweden and Portugal) and 
focused on the rejection of the British free-entry deregulation by most of the analysed coun-
tries. While most authorities still adopted a rather conservative stance to most forms of com-
petitive pressure, a number of them had already started to introduce competitive tendering.  
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That paper was probably the first one engaging in such an international comparison of the 
evolution of organisational forms in public transport in Europe. Organisational forms contin-
ued to evolve in the ensuing decade and numerous publications have in the meantime reported 
on their performances.1 This chapter aims at providing an overview of the main directions of 
change that could be witnessed in those countries during the last decade without focussing on 
performance changes. Legal and regulatory changes are complex to describe and often contain 
many subtleties. As it is impossible to treat this exhaustively within the scope of this paper, 
this chapter will focus on the main evolutions within the general legal and regulatory frame-
works of local and regional public transport (sometimes including rail) in the same ten mem-
ber states of the European Union in terms of contracting and competition. We include some 
plans for the near future but refer the reader to Gwilliam and van de Velde (1990) for devel-
opments prior to 1990. 
The countries 
• Great Britain 
Few things changed during the 90s in the organisational form of local and regional public 
transport put in place in the 80s in Britain (deregulation, liberalisation and privatisation out-
side London; central planning, privatisation and full outsourcing in London). The railways, on 
the contrary, were submitted to radical changes after 1993. The London tendering scheme 
passed from gross-cost to net-cost and then returned to gross-cost. Deregulated areas settled 
down, concentration took place and passengers continued to decrease. 
The main changes came with the new transport policy promoted by the New Labour govern-
ment since 1997 as policy initiatives were developed to tackle some of the problems linked to 
deregulation and privatisation. These give local authorities since the 2000 Transport Act some 
more control on local public transport supply by legalising quality partnerships2; a practice 
that had appeared to improve public transport quality. Tendering exclusive rights to operators 
has also become possible but only as an exception, i.e. under the condition that such so-called 
‘quality contract’ is the only practicable way of implementing the policies the authority set 
out in its bus strategy. 
• Eire 
Public transport organisation (large publicly owned operators) in Ireland has remained stable 
in the past decade. However, government consultation papers have been published describing 
reform proposals that would lead to the reform, and partly privatisation, of the large publicly 
owned companies and a larger participation of the private sector. As a first step, Dublin bus 
has been asked to introduce some sub-contracting by competitive tendering of bus routes. 
Further steps would include the creation of an independent regulatory body that would take 
care of further competitive tendering. In parallel, more private operators have been allowed to 
enter on the basis of market initiative (under the current legislation dating back to 1932) for as 
 
1 The ISOTOPE study (1997), in which this author participated, refers to several such studies and contains addi-
tional evidence. 
2  In such partnerships, local authorities can guarantee, e.g., some level of investment in public facilities (such as 
bus lanes or shelters) in exchange for improvements in the quality of service supply by independent transport 
operators, such as vehicle quality standards. Guarantees in terms of frequencies may not be asked though. 
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much as these do not compete with pre-existing services. Both actions are meant to generate a 
larger pool of operators for the future regime. 
It is not clear yet how the balance between the current legal market initiative regime and the 
authority initiative3 through tendering will settle as further decisions have to be made on this 
point. While integrated planning and tendering will clearly get a place, it seems that market 
initiative will also be allowed to keep a role, especially outside of the Greater Dublin Area. It 
should be noted in this context that a fringe of non-licensed private operations has gradually 
developed besides the state-run companies. 
• Denmark 
The transport law for Copenhagen made the usage of competitive tendering compulsory. This 
process started in 1990 and will be ended by 2002. There is no obligation to use competitive 
tendering in the rest of Denmark, yet the usage of competitive tendering has gradually be-
come the norm in the last ten years, such that provincial ‘public transport companies’4 are 
now in effect only public transport planners. There currently remain only two urban compa-
nies that do not use competitive tendering, one of which has decided to introduce it soon. 
Recently it was decided that a first batch of about 15% of the railway sector would also be 
submitted to competitive tendering. 
The tendering regime developed in Copenhagen started with rather simple gross cost con-
tracts. As in all other regions of Denmark, it was chosen to retain revenue risk. Quality man-
agement features were gradually added. Yet, quality incentives to operators are solely related 
to operational aspects and not to tactical (service design) aspects. This regime tends to serve 
as an example for the rest of the country. Recently a new ‘Capital region development coun-
cil’ (HUR) was created to integrate public transport planning in Copenhagen with wider re-
gional issues. The pre-existing ‘Capital region public transport company’ (known as HT), that 
was responsible for the planning of bus services in the region, was integrated in this new 
structure. A further five local railways and a metro line (in construction) will be integrated too 
while regional rail services remain under the responsibility of the Danish State railways 
(DSB). Yet, all modalities continue to fall under one integrated fare regime managed by HT. 
The growing concentration of the market (and lately the take-over of the former state owned 
Combus –formerly DSB Bus– that had come into financial difficulty by the British Arriva) 
leads some to fear the appearance of an oligopoly. 
• Sweden 
The organisation of public transport in Sweden has moved since 1989 from an ossified market 
initiative regime, where operators had exclusive monopoly rights, to a regime that is essen-
tially based on authority initiative and where regional transport authorities (sometimes in the 
form of a company owned by local and regional authorities) are responsible for the public 
 
3 In short, we speak of market initiative regimes when (independent and/or private) operators are legally allowed to 
autonomously take the initiative to create transport services or request from an authority an authorisation to operate 
such services. We speak of authority initiative regimes when operators have legally no right to create services 
autonomously and where market entry can only be the result of a specific request by an authority to create trans-
port services according to more or less detailed prescriptions by that authority (van de Velde, 1999). 
4 The Danish law gives regional authorities (municipalities and provinces) outside the Capital region of Copenha-
gen the power to organise public transport jointly or separately. For this purpose they can create ‘public transport 
companies’ that are allowed to produce all services themselves or contract out services. 
 4
transport planning (routes, timetable and fares), while operations is contracted out by com-
petitive tendering. Tendering is not limited to bus services. It has also spread to most regional 
railway services and the Stockholm metro. Tendered contracts, mostly of the route-by-route 
type, have led to substantial cost reductions. In the same period, publicly owned companies 
operators where privatised or taken over. Overall, the number of operators decreased. 
The content of contracts evolved slowly. Some have expressed their fears that the current 
gross cost contracts exert too much pressure on costs and do not allow for sufficient innova-
tion. A minority movement towards net cost contracts and more freedom of planning for op-
erators can be seen but this is currently limited to the cities of Helsingborg, Sundsvall and 
Östersund where network contracts have been let. 
• The Netherlands 
Local and regional public transport in the Netherlands was historically based upon the princi-
ple of market initiative but moved de facto gradually away from that principle, giving a great 
degree of stability to incumbent operators, which were mostly authority-owned. The 1988 
Passenger Transport Act was meant to simplify the regulatory framework (limited deregula-
tion), to better integrate services and give more control on the growing deficits. A lump-sum 
subsidisation regime was implemented while the nation-wide ticket and fare integration intro-
duced in 1980 was maintained. The subsidisation was rather complex and often fine-tuned by 
the Ministry. It moved from a supply norm base, to a passenger-km base and finally a passen-
ger revenue base but it was crippled with exceptions and time lags that weakened its incentive 
power. Regional transport companies, owned by the state or local authorities, were amalga-
mated into one large group before being split again and for some parts privatised in order to 
generate competitors for the pending tendering regime. Autonomous entry by private opera-
tors, while still legally possible, hardly ever took place in practice. 
The period from 1992 to 2000 witnessed a seemingly interminable discussion on the introduc-
tion of a competitive tendering regime instead (two experiences with competitive tendering 
(with mixed results) even took place in 1994). The reform aim was twofold: more attractive 
public transport services (especially in areas worst hit by congestion) and an improvement in 
cost recovery ratios. This was to be realised by a decentralisation of tasks and powers to pro-
vincial and regional authorities, the introduction of competitive tendering for concessions and 
putting authority-owned local transport companies at arm’s length or privatising them. Ac-
cording to the resulting 2000 Passenger Transport Act, 35% of services have to be competi-
tively tendering by January 2003 (2006 for municipal transport services). A go/no-go decision 
to move to 100% in 2006 will take place after a Parliamentary evaluation (based on passen-
gers, quality and costs) in 2004. Implementation is currently starting and the first tendered 
concessions should be granted soon. 
• Germany 
The decentralization of subsidisation and parts of the legislation to the German states were 
main changes that took place after German reunification. In most cases, local authorities were 
granted the power (or duty) to establish regional transport plans that are leading when opera-
tors requests authorisations to provide transport services, even if the legal principle of market 
initiative remained. At the same time, the Verkehrsverbünde –transport associations co-
ordinating public transport in larger areas that were sometimes created by operators– were 
granted a more formal position and were sometimes re-established as co-operation of local 
authorities. 
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German public transport is legally based on the principle of free entrepreneurship and market 
initiative. Yet, financial support to publicly owned companies is organised in such a way and 
markets are so strictly regulated in practice that freedom of initiative hardly exists and incum-
bents have, de facto, a preferential position. Furthermore, most services are provided by pub-
licly owned companies even if, in the countryside, a substantial part is provided by small pri-
vate operators, more often on the basis of traditional sub-contracting, even if competitive 
tendering is gaining ground in these areas. 
German law makes a distinction between profitable services, which can be granted without 
tendering to requesting operators, and non-profitable services, that have to be tendered since a 
change in the law enacted a few years ago. Despite this, few services are tendered as services 
provided by municipal companies are defined to be profitable using revenues from cross-
subsidisation from other public utilities (such as electricity distribution). Furthermore, several 
sources of subsidy (such as those on rolling stock investments) prevent new entrants from 
having a fair access to markets. The regional railway sector saw more changes with the grow-
ing usage of competitive tendering after the decentralization of financial means from the fed-
eral government to the federated states. Yet, the current organisation of the DB (the national 
railway company) and its behaviour are seen by some people as not conducive to a quick 
spread of further competitive tendering. 
The whole (cross-)subsidisation issue is currently subject to the scrutiny of courts. The stakes 
are high. The presumption of many observers that much of this subsidisation is incompatible 
with the current German legislation may be confirmed by the judgement. This would mean 
that a substantial part of German public transport is suddenly illegal in that it should have 
been tendered rather than simply granted to the historic operator. In order to prepare for such 
an eventuality, several operators have started to prepare themselves by trying to reach a true 
commercial operation status in order to avoid competitive tendering, some Verkehrsverbünde 
have started to orientate themselves on competitive tendering and the Union of German cities 
realises what the new position of authorities might (have to) become. Even if many still fa-
vour the status quo, the general expectation is that markets, eventually, will open up. How-
ever, private entry is for the time being more easily achieved by takeovers than by participa-
tion in the few cases of competitive tendering.  
• Belgium 
Public transport legislation in Belgium changed considerably after the federalisation of the 
country in three regions (Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels) in 1990. The national bus company 
was split into two regional (Flemish and Walloon) operators. The remaining urban operators 
(Antwerp, Ghent, Liège, Verviers and Charleroi), owned by the state until 1989, were merged 
with their respective regional operators. The existing operator in Brussels (STIB/MIVB) was 
‘recreated’ as a separate regional transport company. Management contracts were signed be-
tween each regional government and its own operator(s). These contracts mostly include spe-
cific aims related to the quantity and quality of service and include commitments from the 
authority as to the subsidisation budget available to the operator. The current contract between 
the Flemish government and its operator “De Lijn” is valid for the period 1997-2001. 
About 30 to 40% of non-urban public transport in Belgium is traditionally operated by so-
called “tenants”. These small family companies operate under gross cost contracts and owe 
their position to historic rights rather than to competitive tendering. Their services are planned 
by the regional operator. “De Lijn” decided a few years ago not to renew the current tenant 
contracts and to use competitive tendering instead while continuing to operate the remaining 
60% of services in-house. Besides trade union pressures, the wish to maintain production 
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expertise and bargaining power in front of possible oligopolies is one of the reasons for this 
choice. In the meantime, several tenants were taken over by foreign companies, such as Lin-
jebuss (Connex-Vivendi). Wallonia on the contrary has not yet decided to introduce competi-
tive tendering. On the contrary, the public operator there has even bought one of its tenants 
and is participating in bids elsewhere together with others. Recently, the region of Brussels 
decided to reorganize its public operator to provide more accounting transparency and more 
efficiency. For this purpose, a split will gradually be made between planning and production, 
introducing elements of internal benchmarking and also some competitive tendering. 
With different speeds, Belgium is moving towards the so-called Scandinavian model (split 
between planning and operations, gradual introduction of competitive tendering of the opera-
tions, continued public planning by the former public operator). However, full-scale tendering 
is consciously rejected. 
• France 
The legislation introduced in 1982, and according to which control on public transport had 
been decentralised5 to the Départements6 except where (co-operating7) municipalities had 
themselves taken over responsibility for their urban area, meant that the principle of authority 
initiative was gradually to replace all remnants of market initiative (some routes were/are still 
profitable in the countryside). According to this regime, transport authorities have to contract 
services to operators unless they decide to retain their legal right to public production. This 
period saw a gradual spreading of contracting and tendering and sometimes the introduction 
of public private partnerships for the developments of new (underground) rail systems in pro-
vincial cities. Pure private financing hardly ever took place, however. 
The usage of competitive tendering became compulsory only after 1994 but the legislation 
continued to allow authorities to provide services directly or through their own company. The 
competitive tendering legislation applicable to public transport allows for negotiations within 
the procedure; a main difference with the tendering legislation applicable to service contracts 
in France (and in Europe). An important discussion took place during the following years 
about its applicability to public transport. The question was whether usual public transport 
contracts had to be assimilated to simple service contracts in view of the high level of subsidi-
sation (typically about two thirds of total production costs) and the low level of revenue risk 
incurred by operators in most (urban) cases. A court ruling gave more sight on the borderline 
between both situations. The consequence is that contracts classified as ‘service contracts’ 
now fall under stricter tendering rules that do not, in principle, allow for negotiations within 
the procedure. 
The railway sector is not yet covered by tendering obligations but contracting has recently 
been introduced for regional railway services following an experimental phase considered 
successful in those Régions that had implemented it. All Régions will now have to contract 
their rail services to the national railway company SNCF (monopolist by law). Competitive 
tendering of these services, especially looking at the success of French operators in foreign 
railway contracts, is to be expected sooner or later, even if this topic remains rather taboo. 
 
5 The Paris region retained the older legislation. This case will not be discussed here. 
6 France is subdivided in Régions, Départements and Communes (municipalities). 
7 Authorities were given large freedoms to organise local co-operations to compensate for the small size French 
municipalities. 
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• Italy 
Changes in legislation took place during this decade in order to fit public transport to the gen-
eral process of decentralisation that took place in Italy. Regions where given the possibility to 
decide on the organisational form of their public transport systems. Competitive tendering 
became possible, was chosen sometimes, but was not compulsory. Furthermore, some public 
companies where put at arm’s length or privatised. Overall, however, few changes can the 
observed and only a few regions started to move cautiously towards the first reforms. 
Rome has recently introduced a number of changes similar to the London or Copenhagen 
regime (splitting the company in planning and operations divisions). Furthermore, a contract 
was signed between planning division and city to set parameters concerning service design, 
competitive tendering of the operations became possible and was started. 
• Spain 
Regional authorities are in Spain responsible for transport policy and for network planning, 
timetables and fares in public transport. Public transport is operated under a regime of author-
ity initiative by own production or concession to private operators. A major change that has 
been carried through during the last decade is the introduction of contracts between these 
authorities and the national government in order to guarantee a clear relationship between the 
subsidies given by the government and the performances of the various public transport sys-
tems. Contractualisation with transport operators is gaining ground, as is competitive tender-
ing in this context.  
• Portugal 
A legislation dating back to 1990 in Portugal introduced some deregulation in public transport 
but this has not been followed in practice, however, such that older legislation is still active. 
According to the new legislation, operators are free, outside Lisbon and Porto, to provide 
services based on market initiative (authorisations regime). Yet, urban public transport and a 
number of other main services are considered a public service that can be operated either by 
the local authority or under a concession that can be granted without competition. However, 
one new suburban railway line in Lisbon has now been competitively tendered. 
THE PENDING REFORM OF THE 1191/69 REGULATION 
The European Commission produced in July 2000 (European Commission, 2000) a long 
awaited proposal for a regulation on “action by Member States concerning public service 
requirements and the award of public service contracts in passenger transport by rail, road and 
inland waterway”. This text, if adopted, is meant to replace the current regulation 1191/69 (as 
amended by regulation 1893/91). The Commission’s proposal is based upon the general prin-
ciple of the development of competition for the provision of public transport, in accordance 
with the conclusions of the European Council of Lisbon of March 2000 that asked to speed up 
liberalisation in areas such as transport. 
The reform of the 1191/69 Regulation is certainly the most important contentious issue of the 
past years in public transport at the European level and will be a major determinant for all 
organisational forms in Europe in public transport in the future years, if eventually adopted. 
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The reasons for a new proposal 
The current regulation 1191/69 enumerates forms of compensation that are compatible with 
the reimbursement for the discharge of certain ‘obligations inherent in the concept of the pub-
lic service’ that are allowed by the EC treaty. It allows competent authorities to impose public 
service obligations on operators, when these are necessary to ensure the provision of adequate 
transport services, and to reimburse operators for the cost of this. It lays down detailed rules 
for calculating the financial burden resulting from the imposition of such obligations and ex-
empts such compensations from the Treaty’s state aid notification procedure. Regulation 
1893/91 amends this basic framework by establishing a second mechanism –the conclusion of 
public service contracts– as the normal method of securing the fulfilment of public service 
objectives, while leaving room for the imposition of obligations. However, it does not address 
the question of how to award public service contracts. The award of certain public service 
contracts is subject to directives on public procurement (92/50/EEC and 93/38/EEC), but 
many contracts –notably those classified as concessions– are not subject to those procedures. 
Furthermore, the regulation does not address the question of the opening of the market for the 
provision of public transport services. 
When regulation 1191/69 was adopted, and amended, public transport markets were mostly 
not opened to competition, operators were exclusively national and in most member states a 
significant proportion of public transport was provided by public administrations or publicly 
owned companies holding a monopoly position. An argument used by the Commission to 
justify action is that the economic situation of public transport changed considerably during 
the past decade. All but four member states have introduced some elements of competition –
mostly competitive tendering– in their national legislation and operators originating in other 
member states make increasing use of these opportunities. This has lead to the appearance of 
international operators and, as operators established themselves in other member states and 
entered the market there, the Commission concludes that it is time to establish clear rules at 
Community level to avoid the need for the Commission or the courts to resolve legal ques-
tions case by case, promoting legal certainty and harmonising key procedural aspects in 
member states, while removing obstacles which the present regulation places in the way of 
modern approaches to public transport (European Commission, 2000). 
Some of the argumentation relates to the Treaty. Firstly, while the Treaty requires member 
states to ensure freedom of establishment, it also allows under certain conditions to restrict 
this principle when necessary for the operation of ‘services of general interest’. Yet, this has 
to be proportionate. The Commission considers that no text currently provides sufficient 
guidance for authorities and operators to assess, with a degree of legal certainty, whether an 
exclusive right is proportionate or not. Secondly, while the current regulation exempts com-
pensations from the Treaty’s compulsory state aid notification, it does not provide for mecha-
nisms to assess the proportionality of such compensations. While that may have been appro-
priate at the time, the gradual emergence of a single market for the provision of public trans-
port means, according to the Commission, that there is now both national and Community 
interest to prevent abuses. Moreover, as the Treaty requires public financing to distort neither 
competition nor the freedom of establishment, the Commission considers that fair, open and 
non-discriminatory procedures are needed to avoid over-compensation8. In that respect, the 
Commission also refers to the Isotope research study (ISOTOPE Research Consortium, 
1997). According to this study, competitive tendering has the advantage to lead to substantial 
improvements in cost-effectiveness while allowing for increases in attractiveness (measured 
 
8 Yet, where such procedures can not be employed, compensations should be paid in line with accurate calculations 
of their financial effect, a procedure close to the current one. 
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in ridership trends), larger cost-effectiveness improvements could be reached by full deregula-
tion but these were not matched by simultaneous increases in ridership and closed markets 
regimes, while reaching improvements in attractivity too –though smaller– were at a substan-
tial disadvantage in terms of cost-effectiveness. 
Finally, the Commission also considers that the existing regulatory framework is out of date 
and inadvertently rules out approaches that ought to be permitted. For example: enabling tick-
eting and information integration with long-distance services, simplifying the rules on the 
calculation of compensations and on separate accounting, clarifying how authorities can lay 
down general ‘rules of the game’ applying to all operators without having to conclude public 
service contracts with each one, and clarifying how authorities can protect existing employees 
in situations where public service contracts change hands (European Commission, 2000). 
The proposal 
Considering that the recent opening of national public transport market on the basis of na-
tional legislation and the emergence of multinational operators requires to update Community 
law, the Commission (European Commission, 2000) states that its proposal is developed aim-
ing at ensuring better value for money and better quality services, ensuring that operators 
have real opportunities to gain access to other markets through fair, open and non-
discriminatory procedures for the award of financial compensations and exclusive rights, 
harmonising key aspects of the competitive procedures developed in the different member 
states, and promoting legal certainty about rights and duties of operators and authorities in 
relation to Community law on state aids and exclusive rights as they affect public transport. 
The Commission stresses that the regulation does not determine the goals public services 
should achieve, nor the way to pursue them, nor the balance between the role of authorities 
and operators in service specification and development. It does not lay down specific institu-
tional structures and continues to allow member states to decide which bodies will act as 
competent transport authority. And while the proposal is based upon the principle of con-
trolled competition (i.e. competitive tendering), it still allows for a wider diversity of mecha-
nisms throughout the Community (European Commission, 2000). 
The proposed regulation, which is very close to the recommendations included in the expert 
study the Commission commissioned (NEA et al., 1998)9 as a preparation to this proposal, is 
applicable to national and international public passenger transport by rail, road and inland 
waterway. It lays down the conditions under which competent authorities may compensate 
operators for the cost of fulfilling public service requirements, the conditions under which 
they may grant exclusive rights in public transport and it introduces the principle that compe-
tent authorities should normally pursue legitimate public service objectives within a frame-
work of ‘regulated competition’, i.e. fair, open and non-discriminatory competitive tendering 
(art. 1). It determines that the public procurement directives 92/50/EEC and 93/38/EEC, when 
these make competitive tendering of public service contracts compulsory, should get priority 
above the new regulation (art. 2) and it defines (art. 3) the main concepts used in the proposal 
(such as competent authority, direct award, exclusive rights, integrated service, public service 
requirements, etc.). 
Art. 4 requires authorities to strive towards the realisation of ‘adequate public passenger 
transport service’ whichever way public transport is initiated. It requests specific attention for 
a minimum number of issues in the evaluation of public service adequacy and selection and 
 
9 The author of this paper was member of the consortium that wrote this study. 
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award criteria (quality of services, consumer interests, fares, accessibility, integration, envi-
ronment, regional development, health and safety, professionality, complaint management 
etc.) 
Public service contracts have to be concluded for the award of all exclusive rights and/or for 
the payment of all financial compensations for public service requirements (art. 5). However, 
compensations paid for compliance with general rules for public transport operation (general 
‘rules of the game’) in accordance with article 10 are also allowed. As a general rule (art. 6), 
public service contracts have to be competitively tendered for a maximum five years (but 
payback periods can be taken into account when specific investments have to be made). 
However (art. 7), direct contract award may be authorised by the Commission for specific 
cases in rail-bound activities when rail safety standards can not be fulfilled in any other way 
or when co-ordination costs between infrastructure and operations would otherwise exceed 
potential benefits (furthermore bus activities of an operator may be included in such contracts 
when these are fully integrated10). Direct award is also allowed for contracts of less than Euro 
400.000/year (Euro 800.000 when an authority includes all its services in one contract), 
measured by the total payment to the operator and ticket revenue not transferred to the author-
ity. Finally, direct award is also allowed once when an operator proposes a new service where 
none exists and that this service does not require financial support through public service con-
tract. 
Public service contracts can also be awarded for individual routes according to a simplified 
‘quality comparison’ procedure (art. 8), after publication of a notice inviting proposals, when 
the award of an exclusive right is not subject to financial compensation. 
A number of safeguards are also defined in art. 9. An authority can require from an operator 
to subcontract up to half the value of the services covered by the contract, an operator can be 
excluded from contract award if that would give him more than one quart of the relevant mar-
ket and in the award of exclusive right contracts, an authority can require from the winning 
operator to offer to staff previously engaged the same rights as what would have been the case 
in application of Directive 77/187/EEC11. 
Authorities may also (i.e. in combination with awarding public service contracts or not) spec-
ify general rules or ‘minimum criteria’ to be respected by all operators (‘rules of the game’) in 
a specific area and may include corresponding compensations (art. 10). Such compensations 
have to be available to all operators. However, these may not limit tariffs for all categories of 
passengers and the amount of compensation may not exceed 20% of the value of the services 
considered. Furthermore, the corresponding additional costs, revenues and compensations 
have to be identifiable in their accounts and show the absence of transfers to others activities 
(art.15). 
Various procedural issues and final provisions are defined in further articles. One important 
provision requires operators to treat services subject to public service contracts as a separate 
accounting division. The core of the current regulation 1191/69, as amended by regulation 
1893/91, continues to be valid for all compensations that are not the result of a competitive 
tender (art. 16 and appendix 1). A transition period of three years (six years in cases of in-
 
10 Defined as: same pool of employees having the same contractual status, single operating account, information 
service, ticketing and timetable. 
11 This Directive pertains to the rights of employees in transfers of undertakings or businesses. 
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vestment in rail infrastructure) is given to the member state to make sure their regulations are 
in line with this regulation (art. 17). 
Suggested amendments and commentary 
The proposal will now be discussed in Parliament. During this period, amendments and com-
promises will be made. A first step is the concept report delivered in May 2001 by the MEP 
designated as reporter by the regional policy, transport and tourism commission of the Euro-
pean Parliament (European Parliament, 2001). This amendment report (further referred to as 
‘AR’), containing 77 amendments, will be presented and discussed in this section. It will also 
benefit from comments by the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and the Com-
mittee on Legal Affairs and the Internal Market of the European Parliament. The report of the 
first of these two committees has not yet been agreed upon, but a draft indicates by and large 
an agreement with the principle of the Commission’s proposal even if a number of amend-
ments are suggested, e.g. aiming at clarifying the possibility for negotiations within the com-
petitive tendering procedure. The report of the second committee, which has been approved, 
suggests amendments that reinforce the competitive nature of the Commission’s proposal by 
abolishing number of exceptions and protections against competition. This will all be dis-
cussed in the Parliament’s commission before being submitted to the vote in commission and 
then in plenary. 
While the list of amendments may change substantially in the process, we nevertheless think 
that it is useful to review them at this stage and in this paper as they give a clear view on the 
points of view and (mis)conceptions that determine the debate and the evolution of organisa-
tional forms in public transport in Europe. We will present in this section the discussion on 
the amendments, grouped in a few main topics to which they pertain. As much as possible we 
will explain the origins of the amendments and their link with corresponding national situa-
tions. To clarify presentation, we have indented and italicised the paragraphs that include our 
explanations and comments on the proposed amendments. 
• Limiting the general principle of competitive tendering 
The AR (amendments to art. 1, 3 and 9) wants to limit the general principle of competitive 
tendering by allowing a competent authority to decide to produce services by itself, through 
an own company or through public service contracts (in which case the regulation would ap-
ply); a motivated choice not to use competitive tendering would then have to be mentioned to 
the Commission but an amendment to art. 7 aims at suppressing the Commission’s role in 
authorising each exception to the general rule of compulsory competitive tendering. 
The AR is clearly opposed to the compulsory usage of competitive tendering and follows 
strictly the principles written in the current French legislation according to which au-
thorities can produce service themselves or decide to contract these out in which case 
specific tendering rules should apply. This principle of local democracy, and subsidiarity, 
is put forward to justify this choice. It is also put forward in an amendment to the consid-
erations that the existence of the two types of companies (authority monopolies and com-
mercial operators) would allow for a comparison and to some competition by emulation. 
As a problem of reciprocity appears by allowing authorities to abstain from competitive ten-
dering, the AR defines a new category of ‘territory-bound operator’ under art. 3, i.e. an opera-
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tor created to provide services in a specific territory and that is not allowed12 to participate in 
competitive tendering for service contracts in other areas. Conversely, operators that are not 
territory-bound and that participate in competitive tendering are requested (amendment to art. 
6) to provide accounting and statutory proof of the absence of cross-subsidisation originating 
in other transport activities or in other sectors to be allowed to participate in competitive ten-
dering. The Commission, however, argues that reciprocity clauses are legally very doubtful in 
Community law. 
The fear is that subsidised authority-owned monopolies may use parts of their subsidy or 
their preferential financial situation to compete unfairly with private operators elsewhere 
leads here to the creation of ‘territory-bound operators’ that would clearly mostly be 
public operators or publicly-owned13 operators. This compromises between the French 
desire to continue to allow direct production by transport authorities (or its own opera-
tor) and the international concern for distortion of competition that could appear if pro-
tected (subsidised) companies would be allowed to participate in competitive regimes 
elsewhere. Essentially, this reciprocity provision seems to be mainly aimed at large 
French state owned monopolies, such as SNCF and RATP, who have recently started to 
compete and operate outside of their traditional territory14 even if they vehemently reject 
any form of competition on their traditional territories. 
The AR also aims at avoiding tendering by enlarging the concept of ‘integrated service’ (art. 3 
and 7) from those provided by one operator to all services provided by several operators. In 
addition, the requirement for prior approval by the Commission based on performances indi-
cators is suppressed.  
The enlargement of the definition of integrated services is an attempt to prevent the appli-
cation of the proposal to integrated multi-operators in German agglomerations 
(Verkehrsverbünde) while integrated single-operator in French agglomerations would 
benefit from an exemption according to art. 7. This is probably dictated by the fact that 
doubts had arisen as to whether exceptions for integrated urban networks could actually 
be applied in the German case where rights are granted on a route-by-route basis.  
The rather sibylline article 7, pertaining to the conditions under which competitive tendering 
is not compulsory, is subject to a large number of amendments aiming at increasing the num-
ber of cases for exemption and suppressing all approval procedures by the Commission. The 
AR adds exceptions for specific quality aims, innovative experiments, system complexity, 
age, intensity of use, etc. and when the incumbent operator would have an incontestable ad-
vantage. It increases the threshold values to Euro 1 million and 2 million and allows the split-
ting of contracts leading to avoidance of tendering explaining that the original provision 
would be difficult to enforce. It defines additional cases under which direct award becomes 
possible (unsuccessful tendering, extreme urgency and maintaining an operator of last resort 
up to a level of 10% of the relevant network). 
While the two first of these additional points are procedural questions that are common to 
tendering procedures, the last one raises a more important issue that is especially rele-
 
12 Including all operators in which these detain more than 20% of the shares. 
13 By ‘public’ or ‘publicly-owned’ operators we refer to the European meaning of the word referring to direct 
operations by (local) government administrations or owned by (local) government. 
14 This territoriality principle existed in French law but was recently removed precisely in order to allow RATP to 
operate outside of its historical territory. 
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vant in those cases where route-by-route tendering is used (such as in London, Copenha-
gen or in Flanders) and where the tenderer who may wish to retain some operational ex-
pertise or may wish to have a weapon available if oligopolies were to develop. 
An amendment to art. 9 specifies that no parts of the regulation may be used to ‘dismantle’ 
integrated operators. 
Integrated operators are further protected by this rather political statement using the 
quality benefits of integration as excuse. Regimes as London or Copenhagen, that would 
here be qualified as ‘dismantled’ prove the contrary, but this was clearly not understood. 
This is illustrative of the scant vision one has, in France in particular, about the function-
ing of integrated network route-by-route tendering schemes that are widedy used outside 
France. It is the concept of equality between citizens within an administrative territory 
that is, strangely, responsible for the wrong perception that such equality can intrinsi-
cally not be achieved by multiple sub-contractors. Behind this lays the French tradition –
though often fiction in practice– according to which service planning powers are sup-
posed to be given to the operator. 
The AR also wants to remove the preferential position of the European procurement direc-
tives. 
According mainly to a German interpretation, this would otherwise impose tendering of 
all local and regional public transport according to Directive 92/50/EEC, leaving –
ironically– little purpose to the present proposal. The main reason for the Commission to 
add this provision is essentially to reduce uncertainty as to the applicability of the various 
texts. 
• Public service contracts 
The AR adds nuances to existing clauses. The French public service concepts of ‘continuity, 
adaptability and equality’ and the German concern for safety are added to the list of selection 
or award criteria. Sentences are rewritten such as to make sure that authorities retain powers 
to dictate service characteristics to operators and a whole range of elements such as imposed 
fares, additional service integration, future conversions to rail-based services, high quality 
employment and collective labour agreements are added in list of elements to take into ac-
count when selecting operators and awarding contracts. In the case of the rights of employees, 
the AR goes even above what is usual in Community law (Directive 77/187/EEC) by requir-
ing similar or better rights when personnel is transferred to a winning operator. Amendments 
to art. 6 aim at lengthening the maximum contract lengths to eight years. Strangely, a mini-
mum length of four years is also introduced. Even more strangely, authorities are asked to 
include a clause allowing them to cancel a contract in case they decide to replace bus by rail 
services during the contract’s life. More usefully, an amendment is made to allow for enough 
flexibility by precising that changes can be made during the contract without amounting to a 
new contract for as much as the contract length is not modified. 
These additions, seemingly aiming at more decision power for the authorities, rest on 
misunderstandings and most are, strictly speaking, superfluous as the original text does 
not limit competent authorities in the specification of service requirements that operators 
have to fulfil. In fact, the proposal is designed such as to confirm the general interest ap-
proach and ensure that authorities pay attention to at least a minimum number of (qual-
ity) dimensions in defining selection and award criteria. Many of the elements added here 
are political in nature and tend to impose specific intervention aims to (local) authorities 
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and do not fit in general legal texts at the European level. Rather than giving additional 
power to tendering authorities, they implicitly show a lack of trust in the future behaviour 
of tendering authorities by stressing a number of political aims that could (or should) be 
furthered. 
• Direct award 
The AR aims at abolishing the clause (art. 7) limiting the exemption from competitive tender-
ing when an operator suggest a new non-subsidised service where no services exists to only 
the first time such a new service is proposed. It argues that this is an unnecessary provision as 
no state aid is involved and as it unnecessarily limits local democracy. 
The proposal gives a right to an existing operator to benefit from its position for suggest-
ing new services. The reason is that not allowing this may unduly prevent the appearance 
of such additional profitable services. The proposal limits this to the first time in order to 
remain coherent with the general competition principles of the proposal. Taking this into 
account, one has to come to the conclusion that the state aid argument produced here by 
the AR is not relevant as this is being taken care of in art. 8 (quality comparison proce-
dure). The local democracy argument is however more relevant in view of the general 
approach taken by the AR. 
The AR suggests not limiting the direct award of non-subsidised contracts to route contracts 
(art. 8). 
This corresponds to a particular German wish to extend direct awards to more than sin-
gle routes, even if the current principle of the German law if route-based. 
• General subsidisation for ‘minimum criteria’ (‘rules of the game’) 
The AR suggests abolishing all limitations of the additional subsidisation for minimum crite-
ria (i.e. general ‘rules of the game’). 
It is interesting to see that the nature of the proposal on this point is not at all understood 
by most observers, including the Reporter. While subsidisation according to art. 10 is 
possible in addition to a public service contract or in absence of such a contract (i.e. in 
free market regimes), the article is mostly wrongly perceived as one limiting the maxi-
mum level of total subsidisation of the sector; reason for which the amendments are pro-
posed. One could perhaps doubt whether the limitation to partial subsidisation and to 
20% of service value is adequate, but the main reason for this limitation is to avoid that 
general subsidisations, as it exists in Germany (e.g. to compensate for general through-
tarification requirements inside Verkehrsverbünde, etc.), makes any objective comparison 
as to which level of subsidisation is adequate impossible by having a never-applied nor-
mal full fare as point of reference for the ‘commerciality’ of passenger transport services. 
• Other issues 
The AR maintains the 25% market share limit but adds a free choice for the authority to grant 
all services to only one operator (art. 9) and suggests to abolish the possibility to require from 
a winning operators to sub-contract up to 50% of the value of their services. Instead it sug-
gests to limit this to sub-contracting to incumbent previously involved in public transport 
production. 
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Interestingly, the AR argues that this would prevent favouritism, while the suggested solu-
tion seems even worse in this respect. 
The AR suggests abolishing appendix 1, ruling the calculation of compensations when no 
competitive tendering is used, and replace it by its core principles. 
Yet the main reason put forward –i.e. avoiding bureaucracy– would, combined with all 
exceptions provided by the suggested amendments, open the door to a situation in which 
the payment of compensation is even less regulated than at present. 
The AR suggests a new article limiting the validity of the proposal to a period of 10 years and 
an evaluation by the Parliament and Council after 8 years. 
Taking all exceptions and transitional periods suggested in the AR into account, one 
could wonder whether any implementation at all may take place under these circum-
stances. 
OBSERVATIONS 
The spread of contracting and competitive tendering is incontestably one of the main features 
of the reform of organisational forms in European public transport during the last decade. The 
ensuing internationalisation of the market, with the appearance of larger international opera-
tors, is another main feature. Using a concept for the economics of institutions (Williamson, 
2000), one can say that the introduction of contracting and tendering in Europe took place 
through changes at three levels. Either through changes in contractual content (France, Swe-
den) with the same governance form and the same legal setting, or through changes in gov-
ernance form by introducing new organisational forms within existing or amended legal set-
tings (Germany), or by changing legal settings altogether (the Netherlands). 
The general discussion on these changes both in national, European and wider forums tends to 
be too limited. On the one hand, the potentials that could be provided by market initiative 
based regimes tend to be forgotten as many authorities are tempted by getting or keeping di-
rect decision power on such politically risky topic as public passenger transport. On the other 
hand, the discussion also tends to be too dogmatic as many see competitive tendering as a 
simple solution to all public transport problems both in terms of efficiency and effectiveness 
(attractivity), while other perceive it to be a useless instrument. While competitive tendering 
clearly has shown its potential and has a role to play in the future of public transport when 
based on authority initiative, it should not be forgotten that it is nothing more than an out-
sourcing method. Success requires that specific attention be paid to transport policy aims, to 
the details of tendering implementation and perhaps too to the universality with which tender-
ing should be implemented. 
In this section, we will discuss a few of these issues, as raised by the proposal and the amend-
ments suggested. 
• A challenge to national regimes 
The attention paid to the discussion of this reform proposal varies considerably from country 
to country. Interestingly, some candidate member states to the European Union seem to be 
even more concerned with compliancy with future European rules than current member coun-
tries. The European proposal and the ensuing discussions, with all their vagueness and uncer-
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tainties, pose a substantial challenge to Hungary, e.g., as to the direction to be chosen in re-
forming local public transport in Budapest and the rest of the country. While the former state-
led public transport system is being reformed, the intention would be to devise a ‘Europe 
proof’ regime such as to avoid the need for further reforms in the near future as the country is 
intending to joint the European Union. A similar behaviour could be witnessed several years 
ago in Norway and Sweden when both endeavoured to integrate hypothetical future European 
tendering rules in their national legislation even before becoming member of the European 
Union (eventually, the Norwegian people rejected membership in a referendum). The problem 
then and now, albeit to a lesser extent, is that little can be said about the outcome of the cur-
rent European proposal. So one could say that the Commission’s proposal, while aiming at 
reducing legal uncertainty, is for the time being temporarily increasing legal uncertainty. 
• Is market initiative forgotten? 
The regulation (art. 1) clearly limits the scope of the regulation to exclusive rights and finan-
cial compensations. This means that market initiative regimes where entry is possible at all 
times and for which no other financial compensations are available than those resulting from 
general ‘rules of the game’ (art. 10), such as compensations for fare rebates for specific 
groups of passengers (elderly, handicapped, etc.), are not affected by the regulation. In other 
words, the proposal allows member states15 to choose between market initiative and authority 
initiative regimes but imposes in each case rather strict market principles to follow. If market 
initiative is chosen, fair subsidisation remains possible through art. 10 and exclusive rights are 
possible through art. 8. Exclusive rights are recognised as an instrument that may improve 
attractivity (for reasons such as integration, stability, etc.) but as these limit competition in 
time, the proposal imposes in this case the usage of a simpler quality comparison procedure to 
compare proposals. Imposing formal competitive tendering would indeed make autonomous 
market initiative impossible either by limiting the scope of proposals to the content and timing 
of the reference terms in a call for tender, or it would be demotivating for entrants in that it 
would oblige authorities to publish the potential entrant’s innovative ideas in a call for tender 
open to all. 
The possibility for market initiative offered by the proposal (both deregulated markets and 
light touch regulation) is often overlooked by observers. It is especially those observers for 
which such provision is unknown in their own national framework that tend to overlook it. 
One example can illustrate this. An article published in a French professional journal (La Vie 
du Rail, 2000) for the public transport industry concluded –proudly– that, by and large, 
French practice had served as an example for the proposal (usage of competitive tendering, 
recognition of the importance of the ‘public service’, integrated networks, etc.). Quite impor-
tantly, the article did not even seem to see the possibility given by the proposal to use com-
pletely different regimes based on market initiative, such as the British deregulation or possi-
ble variants on the German market initiative regime. 
Other, as German observers who are used to the legal principle of market initiative, recognise 
the possibilities offered by the proposal. Some even rejoiced too early thinking that the com-
pulsory competitive tendering threat could be avoided by using these market initiative provi-
sions that seemed to be directly copied from the existing German legislation. Reality is differ-
ent, however. The market initiative provisions of the proposal are there to allow a free regime 
choice for member states or competent authorities while guaranteeing simultaneously fair 
competition and the possibility for the usage of instruments that could improve public trans-
 
15 Or any of its administrative sub-divisions that has been made responsible for public transport legislation accord-
ing to the national legislation of that member state. 
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port quality (‘rules of the game’ and exclusive rights) when desired. This allows regimes that 
can be positioned in a range varying from the British deregulation at one extreme, to half-way 
the German ‘market initiative’ at the other extreme. A clear reason for Germany to be worried 
by the consequences of the proposal; this can also be measured by the current blossoming of 
congresses on the potential consequences of the proposal in Germany. Furthermore, Germany 
finds itself in an awkward situation as its own legal framework is currently subject to scrutiny 
by German courts as general practice seems to have become quite remote from the general 
legal principle of the German public transport law. While a literal interpretation of German 
laws is indeed quite compatible with the Commission’s proposal, it would require major 
changes to current practices. The main danger for Germany therefore is a judgment by Ger-
man courts, more than a threat from Brussels. From a pragmatic point of view, full compli-
ancy with the proposal and the spirit of German law is not possible within short, neither from 
a market initiative perspective, nor from an authority initiative perspective as most involved 
actors seem to have no advantage in embracing the proposal. Incumbent operators would 
loose their protected positions, authorities would have to develop bureaucracies and contract-
ing machineries to replace parts of the current situation, municipalities would suffer finan-
cially from the demise of their (inefficient) operators, various fiscally attractive constructions 
would vanish for them too rendering public service contracts potentially more expensive and 
both the federal and state governments may have to review their legislation. 
Market initiative is present in Britain, in Germany –albeit in a moribund state– and in a more 
vital state but mostly in interregional transport in many other countries as Sweden, Norway, 
Portugal, Ireland and Eastern Europe. This fact has to be recognised and requires adequate 
regulation to avoid jeopardising its potential. 
• Compulsory competitive contracting 
The reasoning of the European Commission is based on the developments on the European 
market (some member states opening their markets and internationalisation of supply) and the 
threat of a possible ruling by the European Court of Justice against the current subsidisation 
practices if the existing regulation 1191/69 is not amended. But this leaves many observers 
indifferent. This is reinforced by the fact that transport operators have not yet complained 
about the current situation. 
While the compulsory usage of contracting for the granting of exclusive rights and/or subsi-
dies is acceptable to most if not all stakeholders and while the existing or pending legal situa-
tion in several countries (such as Sweden, Finland, Denmark, the Netherlands, France, Italy, 
Ireland and Great-Britain) is broadly speaking in line with the proposal, there remains impor-
tant barriers to the unconditional acceptation of the proposal. The least of all are differences in 
procedures, market shares thresholds, contractual terms, etc. Compromises can easily be 
reached on these topics without altering the fundaments of the proposal. The main barrier to 
the acceptance of the proposal remains the compulsory usage of competition in the form of 
competitive tendering even if, compared to the initial project, the actual proposal already in-
cluded a number of possible –but uncertain– escapes for some stakeholders, such as large 
integrated urban networks. 
A fundamental problem for a number of countries, France on top, is the frontal attack on the 
legal right of local authorities to produce public transport themselves. Even Denmark, where 
current practice does not vary fundamentally from the European proposal and were most au-
thorities use competitive tendering in public transport even if no law forces them to do so, is 
opposed to the idea that the European commission would impose competitive tendering here 
as this is perceived as a precedent that could lead to further contracting-out obligations for 
 18
other local public services. The Commission would put forward that this is to be limited to 
economic ‘industries’ that are subject to exclusivity rights. Yet, subsidiarity rule is neverthe-
less likely to be called upon to prevent the acceptance of the proposal on this point. More 
countries, as Italy or Belgium, would probably follow similar argumentations. However, the 
vested interests of public operators and political fears for strike threats may actually be as 
important in rejecting tendering as the more noble local democracy reasonings. 
The reporter to the European Parliament is trying to find a way out by allowing a free choice 
between own production and contracting, which is presented by the amendments as a funda-
mental right of (local) administrations and as respect for local democracy. As a compromise, 
reciprocity rules are introduced. But it is questionable how viable this solution would be in 
practice. Furthermore, it would require an unlikely legal step back in France, where a recent 
legal change had made the reverse movement by opening up markets to companies that were 
previously limited to their traditional monopoly area.  
• What about railways? 
The proposal is also valid for all railways services. Many expect that railways will, one way 
or another, be able to benefit from some form of exception or, as a result of compromising, 
eventually be excluded from the proposal. Some observers of the railway business have 
pointed to the fact that this proposal seems to be at odds with the discussions on a further 
liberalization of the railway sector as discussed in the context of the revision of Directive 
91/440. Some may try to escape, as Germany and Italy where railway markets have already –
at least formally– been liberalised and where railways have to operate without operational 
subsidies. Others, as France, may expect to benefit from some exception. Others still, as Swe-
den or the Netherlands, will have to think further about the consequences of this proposal for 
the monopoly rights they have granted –with or without contract– to their national railway 
operator for their main railway network. While recognising the importance of these issues, we 
can not debate them within this paper for reasons of space. 
• Fair competition, conservatism and local democracy 
A long list of amendments to the proposal has been formulated. In a caricature, one could 
distinguish three types of wishes in the proposed amendments. French wishes, having a rather 
political content, and pertaining to social aims in public transport, protection of the labour 
force and respect of local democracy. German wishes, having a rather conservative content, 
and aiming at a status quo in the rather complex organisational forms developed in Germany. 
British and Dutch wishes, having a rather procedural or fairness content, and aiming at ensur-
ing fairness in the transition from existing contracts to new contracts, at ensuring fairness in 
international competition (reciprocity) and at ensuring exemptions for truly exceptional situa-
tions. 
Many amendments contain elements that are out of place in such legislation in that they go 
further than guaranteeing fairness by including political ‘guidance’, some are superfluous in 
that the questions addressed can easily be solved within usual tendering and contracting pro-
cedures by the competent authorities when needed. While a few amendments point at possible 
true problems (e.g. the complexity of some metro systems), on the whole, almost all proposed 
amendments aim at weakening the proposal. Acceptance of the current list of amendments 
would lead to a situation where little would be left of the original proposal: compulsory com-
petitive tendering would not be introduced, the proposal would boil down to a simple com-
petitive tendering procedure regulation for those who choose to use competitive tendering, 
publicly-owned monopolies would continue to exist and compensations would probably be 
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calculated according to less stringent rules than in the current regulation. The question, in-
deed, is whether such regulation would be more compatible with the rest of the European 
legislation than the current one. Clearly, the final word has not yet been spoken.  
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has reviewed some of the salient legal and organisational changes in Europe dur-
ing the last decade. Competitive tendering has now gained a substantial position in the Euro-
pean public transport landscape but it would be wrong, though, to think that it has become 
dominant. Authority-owned companies, either in a legal setting of market initiative or one of 
authority initiative, continue to dominate the urban market in most of Europe. 
The current reform proposals at the level of the European Commission would lead to a cata-
clysmic change in this landscape. But there are still many barriers to such a change as could 
be seen from the discussion on the elements that are currently being used in the suggested 
amendments to this proposal. By doing so, we hope to have adequately illustrated some of the 
main influences in terms of national traditions, legal settings and usages in terms of organisa-
tional forms and contractual forms. 
REFERENCES 
European Commission (2000), "Proposal for a regulation by the European Parliament and the Council 
on the action by member states concerning public service requirements and the award of public 
service contracts in passenger transport by rail, road and inland waterway", COM(2000) 7 def, 
2000/0212 (COD), European Commission, Brussels. 
European Parliament (2001), "Draft report on the proposal for a regulation by the European Parliament 
and the Council on action by member states concerning public service requirements and the 
award of public service contracts in passenger transport by rail, road and inland waterway", 
Committee on Regional Policy, Transport and Tourism, 2000/0212 (COD) prov, European Par-
liament, Brussels. 
Gwilliam, K.M. and D.M. van de Velde (1990), "The Potential for Regulatory Change in European Bus 
Markets", Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, 24, 333-350. 
ISOTOPE Research Consortium (1997), "Improved Structure and Organization for Urban Transport 
Operations of Passenger in Europe", Transport Research Fourth Framework Programme Urban 
Transport, 51, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 177 
pages. 
NEA, Erasmus University, TIS and OGM (1998), "Examination of Community Law Relating to the 
Public Service Obligations and Contracts in the Field of Inland Passenger Transport", NEA, Ri-
jswijk (NL), 179 (annexes 194) pages. 
van de Velde, D.M. (1999), "Organisational forms and entrepreneurship in public transport (Part 1: 
classifying organisational forms)", Transport Policy, 6, 147-157. 
Williamson, O.E. (2000), "The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead", Journal 
of Economic Literature, 38, 595-613. 
The sources of information on legal and organisational forms in Europe are mainly le-
gal texts and personal communications during interviews with observers and actors in-
volved in the reforms in the various countries analysed. 
